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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall**
The United States Supreme Court continued to be extremely active in
the realm of employment discrimination during the 2009 survey period.1
The Court decided five significant employment cases during 2009.
Perhaps the most significant was the decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.,2 in which the Court handed employers a huge victory as
to the burden of proof necessary to establish age discrimination claims
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).3 On the other hand, employees were the clear winner in
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,4 in which the Court
expanded the scope of potential retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).5 Finally, in Ricci v. Destefano,6 the Court, in upholding the use of test scores for promotion to

Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
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1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2009. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (2006); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). For analysis of
Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the prior survey period, see Peter
Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,2008 Eleventh CircuitSurvey,
60 MERCER L. REV. 1173 (2009).
2. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); see Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343.
4. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
7
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1 (2006); see Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846.
6. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
*
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lieutenant and captain within the New Haven, Connecticut Fire
Department, held that the city could not lawfully engage in disparate
treatment discrimination in order to avoid a good faith concern that its
test for promotion resulted in disparate impact discrimination.7
In stark contrast to the Supreme Court, the most significant trend
during the survey period for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was the huge decrease in the number of employment
discrimination cases handed down by the court during the survey period.
In recent years, the court has followed a trend of handing down fewer
and fewer published employment discrimination opinions; however, this
trend had been offset by the significant increase in unpublished
decisions handed down by the appellate court. While the trend toward
fewer published decisions continued during the 2009 survey period
(indeed, there was only one published Title VII opinion during the entire
survey period, and only three published employment discrimination
decisions overall), there was also a marked decrease in the number of
unpublished discrimination opinions during the survey period. In 2008
the Eleventh Circuit handed down approximately eighty-five unpublished Title VII opinions and approximately one hundred twenty
unpublished employment discrimination opinions overall;' in 2009 the
number of unpublished opinions dwindled to only twenty-six unpublished Title VII opinions and forty-five unpublished employment
discrimination opinions overall-or approximately one-third of the
number of cases handed down the previous year. This is an indication
that the law in this area is becoming so well established that not only
are there fewer and fewer unanswered questions for the appellate court
to address, but practitioners have greatly diminished the number of
appeals they are pursuing above the trial court level.
I.

A.

TITLE VII OF THE CvL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Theories of Liability and Burden of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment. In Ricci v. Destefano,9 the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge to the test for promotion
to the rank of lieutenant or captain within the Fire Department of New
Haven, Connecticut. Despite the City of New Haven's efforts to make

7. Id. at 2675.
8. See Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,2008 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2009).
9. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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sure that it developed a promotion test that was fair, job-related, and
nondiscriminatory (including the hiring of an outside consultant to
achieve this result), the actual test results brewed a firestorm of debate.
White candidates clearly outperformed minority candidates. For
instance, of the ten candidates eligible for promotion to lieutenant as a
result of the test, all ten were white. Of the nine candidates eligible for
promotion to captain, seven were white and two were Hispanic. No
black candidate was included in the group eligible for promotion to
either position.' ° After several public hearings and much debate," the
city threw out all of the test scores because of a concern that the test
had a discriminatory impact on the black candidates.' 2 The white and
Hispanic firefighters who were due a promotion based upon the test
results then sued the city under both Title VII' 3 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,14 alleging that they
had been discriminated against on account of their races. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision. 5
The Supreme Court accepted it as a given that the city-however well
intentioned its actions-had discriminated against the white and
Hispanic firefighters on account of their race when it threw out the test
results.' 6 The question before the Court, however, was whether the city
had "a lawful justification for its race-based action." 7 The firefighters,
of course, argued that such disparate treatment discrimination could
only be permitted if the test, in fact, violated Title VII's disparate impact
provision. The city, on the other hand, argued that its actions were
justified as long as it had a good faith belief that the test was discriminatory in impact. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and
adopted a middle ground.18 The Court held that before an employer
can engage in intentional disparate treatment discrimination for the
purpose of avoiding unintended disparate impact discrimination, the
employer must have "a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be
subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious,
discriminatory action." 9 Because there was no genuine dispute that

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 2664-66.
See id. at 2666-71.
Id. at 2671.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. XTV, § 1.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671-72.
Id. at 2674.
Id.
See id. at 2675.
Id. at 2677.
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the city did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe that its
promotion test was unlawful under a disparate impact theory, the
Supreme Court remanded the case and directed that summary judgment
be entered for the firefighters whose test results had been voided.2 °
In Hyde v. K.B. Home, Inc.,21 the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with the familiar issue of what constitutes an "adverse action" for
purposes of disparate treatment liability under Title VII. The plaintiff
brought an action alleging gender and pregnancy discrimination under
Title VII. The district court had granted summary judgment for the
employer, in part, because it found that the plaintiff had not suffered an
adverse employment action.2 2 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she
had suffered the withdrawal of work assignments while taking
intermittent Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)2 3 leave, and this
constituted a sufficient tangible employment action under Title VII. 24
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.25 The court of appeals noted that the
plaintiff's job title did not change, nor did she receive any reduction in
pay.2 6 Although the plaintiff was reassigned and had some responsibilities reduced while taking intermittent FMLA leave, the court noted that
the employer had done so simply to take reasonable steps to ensure that
its business operation was not interrupted.2" Finding no "'serious and
material change in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,'"2"
the court of appeals affirmed.29
2. Sexual Harassment. In Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,3"
the Eleventh Circuit's only published Title VII opinion during the survey
period, the court was confronted with allegations of male-on-male sexual
harassment. The plaintiffs were former Home Depot store managers in
Mobile, Alabama, and Pensacola, Florida. Problems began to occur when
Leonard "Lenny" Cavaluzzi became Home Depot's regional human
resources manager. Within a month of Cavaluzzi's transfer to this

20. Id. at 2681.
21. 355 F. App'x 266 (11th Cir. 2009).
22. Id. at 267-68.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
24. Hyde, 355 F. App'x at 269.
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d
1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)).
29. Id. at 270.
30. 589 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010). Following
preparation of this Article, the Eleventh Circuit vacated this opinion and voted to rehear
the case en banc. See Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010).
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position, he began making inappropriate sexual overtures to both of the
plaintiffs. The overtures included numerous telephone calls of a sexual
nature over a period of months. There were also unwanted physical
touchings, which included massaging the plaintiffs' neck and shoulders,
playing with their hair, hugging them, and on one occasion putting his
hand on one plaintiff's thigh under a table. Both plaintiffs complained
about Cavaluzzi's conduct with a store human resources manager. The
manager spoke to Cavaluzzi several times, but Cavaluzzi's conduct did
not change. The plaintiffs then made a formal complaint pursuant to
Home Depot's sexual harassment policy. There were no incidents of
harassment after this complaint was made. However, less than a month
thereafter, both plaintiffs were terminated as the result of an investigation that allegedly uncovered questionable mark downs and discounted
sales.3" The plaintiffs brought suit under Title VII, alleging hostile
work environment sexual harassment and retaliation. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted
summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently severe or persuasive to create a hostile work
environment and that there was no causal connection between the
plaintiffs' complaint of harassment and the investigation leading to their
termination.32
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit initially noted that "we apply the
same standards to heterosexual sexual conduct and homosexual
conduct." 33 In analyzing the alleged harassing conduct, the court of
appeals noted that some of Cavaluzzi's comments were "merely
complimentary," whereas others were "clearly flirtatious."34 The court
also noted that "[allthough [the plaintiffs] may be subjectively more
uncomfortable because a presumably gay man made the flirtatious
comments, this does not factor into the objective component of the
analysis." 35 The court reached a similar conclusion on the alleged
touching incidents and agreed with the district court that the conduct at
issue "was not sufficiently severe or pervasive."3M However, the court
did conclude that there was enough evidence to show that Cavaluzzi had
participated in the investigations leading to the plaintiffs' terminations
to create a genuine issue of material fact on the retaliation claim.37

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

589 F.3d at 1143-50.
Id. at 1142-43.
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1159.
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Accordingly, the retaliation claim was remanded for further proceedings,
whereas the remainder of the district court's opinion was affirmed. 8
The Eleventh Circuit will review this case en banc.3 9
In Blackmon v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.,4° the plaintiff worked as
a cashier at a Wal-Mart store in Miami, Florida. One of the plaintiff's
coworkers made several sexual comments to the plaintiff, such as, "You
know I want to screw you, don't you?," and the like, culminating in a
single incident in which the coworker came up behind the plaintiff and
grabbed her breast. The plaintiff complained about the touching
incident, and Wal-Mart immediately began an investigation. Within two
weeks, the coworker was terminated from employment. Within a period
of a few weeks following his termination, however, the coworker came
into the store as a customer, and he made threatening remarks to the
plaintiff while she was working as a cashier. When the plaintiff
complained about this conduct, her manager instructed her to simply
walk away from her register if the former coworker came back into the
store. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff was terminated for excessive
The plaintiff brought suit under Title VII and the
absenteeism. 4
Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,42 alleging sexual harassment and
retaliation. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that Wal-Mart's response to her complaint was
inadequate in that although the coworker had been terminated, he
should have been banned from the store in light of his continuing
threatening comments as a customer.43 In rejecting this argument, the
Eleventh Circuit held as follows:
[Wal-Mart] reprimanded [the coworker] several times and, within two
weeks of the touching incident, it terminated his employment. [The
plaintiff's] argument that Wal-Mart should have banned [the coworker]
from the store is unavailing in light of these facts. Wal-Mart's
termination of [the coworker] was a prompt and adequate remedy.44
The court also agreed with the district court that there was insufficient
evidence that the plaintiff's termination was a pretext for retaliation,
and affirmed.45

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1170.
Corbitt, 598 F.3d at 1259.
358 F. App'x 101 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 103-04.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 509.092, 760.01-760.11 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).

43. Blackmon, 358 F. App'x at 104.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 105.
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In Lockett v. Choice Hotels International,Inc.,46 the Eleventh Circuit
again was confronted with the issue of what degree of severity and
pervasiveness is necessary to establish a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. The plaintiff worked in reservations for a Clarion
Hotel in Tampa, Florida. One of her coworkers worked in the hotel caf6.
When the plaintiff would visit the caf6, the coworker made explicit
sexual comments to her. For example, he talked about sexual positions,
said he would "go down on [her] good," said that her boyfriend "ain't
47
F'ing [her] right," and said that she needed "to get with a real guy."
The plaintiff quit using the caf6 for about three weeks and complained
to the hotel about the coworker's behavior. At a meeting to discuss the
matter, the coworker admitted his conduct.4" He also "jumped in [the
plaintiff's] face and acted like he was going to hit [her]."4 9 The plaintiff
responded to him, "I have a boyfriend for you."5" The hotel terminated
the coworker for his sexual statements but also terminated the plaintiff
for threatening the coworker at the meeting. The plaintiff filed suit
alleging hostile environment sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII
and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for the
defendant.51 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district
court, finding that the coworker's conduct, while "offensive," did not meet
the "minimum level of severity or humiliation needed to establish sexual
52
citing the court's prior decision in Mendoza v. Borden,
harassment,"
53
Inc.
3. Pregnancy Discrimination. In AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen,' the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether an employer violates
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)55 by paying pension benefits
calculated under an accrual rule that, until passage of the PDA, gave
less retirement credit for pregnancy leave than for other types of medical
leave.5 6 At issue was AT&T's pension plan. Prior to the passage of the
PDA, AT&T employees on disability leave received full service credit for

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

315 F. App'x 862 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 863 (alterations in original).
Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 864 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 866.
195 F.3d 1238, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 1999) (en bane).
129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. at 1966.
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the entire period of the employee's absence whereas leave for pregnancy
was treated as a "personal" leave, which had a maximum service credit
(initially thirty days, later six weeks). On the effective date of the PDA
in 1979, AT&T changed its plan and began giving full service credit for
pregnancy leave. However, the company did not make any retroactive
adjustment for service credits calculated prior to the enactment of the
PDA. The plaintiffs were four AT&T employees who received less
service credit because they had taken pregnancy leave, ranging from two
months to seven months, prior to the enactment of the PDA. The
plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging that AT&T's
pension plan and its calculation of service credits violated the PDA. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.57
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the payment of
pension benefits was a function of a bona fide seniority system under
Section 703(h) of Title VII. 58 Citing its 1977 decision in Teamsters v.
United States,5 9 the Supreme Court held that "AT&T's system must also
be viewed as bona fide, that is, as a system that has no discriminatory
terms, with the consequence that subsection (h) controls the result here,
just as in Teamsters."' Accordingly, the decision of the Ninth Circuit
was reversed.6 1
4.
Retaliation. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville,6 2 the Supreme Court examined the scope of Title VII's
retaliation provision, found in Section 704(a) of the Act." Specifically,
the Court examined the issue of whether Title VIIs retaliation provision
protects an employee who reveals discrimination, not on her own
initiative, but in answering questions during an employer's internal
investigation." The Court held that the retaliation protection does
extend this far.65
The defendant-employer had begun an investigation into "rumors" of
sexual harassment by its employee relations director. The plaintiff
never complained about the harassment but was interviewed about

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1967-68.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); see Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. at 1969-70.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Hulteen, 129 S.Ct. at 1970.
Id. at 1973.
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 849-50.
Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849-50.

65. Id. at 851.
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whether she had ever witnessed any harassing conduct as part of the
company's investigation. The plaintiff articulated several incidents of
inappropriate behavior by the employee relations director. Soon after
the investigation was completed, the defendant fired the plaintiff,
allegedly for embezzlement. The plaintiff brought suit pursuant to Title
VII, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for the evidence she
provided as to the employee relations director's conduct. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted
summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff's
participation in the defendant's investigation did not fall within the
scope of Title VII's retaliation protection. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision.66 In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court held as follows:
There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can "oppose" by
responding to someone else's question just as surely as by provoking
the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule
protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own
initiative but not one who reports the 6same discrimination in the same
words when her boss asks a question. 1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Sixth Circuit for further proceedings.68

II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Mixed Motive

A.

In perhaps the most significant employment decision rendered during
the survey period, the United States Supreme Court adopted a new
evidentiary standard for ADEA6 9 claims in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.7" Surprising both management and plaintiffs' attorneys,
a sharply divided Court ruled that employees bringing disparate
treatment claims under the ADEA must prove that age was the "but for"
cause of the adverse employment action, not just a motivating factor.7 '
Additionally, the Court held that the burden of persuasion does not shift
to the employer in mixed motive ADEA cases.72

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 850.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 853.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2348.
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Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Thomas held that unlike
the other federal employment discrimination laws, the ADEA does not
specifically provide that an employee may prove discrimination by
simply showing that age was a motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision."
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court's
Title VIIP decision in PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins75 does not apply to
ADEA cases.76 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito joined the majority opinion.77 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer dissented, with Justices Stevens and Breyer writing separate
dissenting opinions.7"
In his dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the "but for" causation
standard was rejected by both the Court in PriceWaterhouse and by
Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' 9 Justice
Stevens also objected that the majority had answered a question that
was not briefed by the parties.8 " He would have answered only the
question presented, and he reasoned that an employee "need not present
direct evidence of age discrimination to obtain a mixed-motives
instruction" and shift the burden of persuasion.8 '
Members of Congress responded swiftly to the decision. On October
6, 2009, lawmakers in both the House and the Senate introduced the
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, 2 which clarifies
the standard of proof in ADEA cases and counteracts the Court's
decision in Gross." The bill would amend the ADEA to clarify the
standard of proof required in ADEA actions, thereby overturning
Gross.& Specifically, the House Bill states that an ADEA plaintiff
establishes an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that age "was a motivating factor for the
practice complained of, even if other factors also motivated that practice"
or that "the practice complained of would not have occurred in the
absence of [the plaintiff's ageI."8 Additionally, the House Bill provides

73. Id. at 2349.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
75. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
Id. at 2346.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1996b (2006); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353.
Id.
S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009).
S. 1756; H.R. 3721.
S. 1756; H.R. 3721.
85. S. 1756; § 3; H.R. 3721, § 3.
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86
that plaintiffs can use the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green evidenv
As has been the
tiary framework to prove a violation of the ADEA.
case with other congressional responses to controversial Supreme Court
decisions in the employment arena, the bill stands a good likelihood of
passage.

B. Arbitrability of Employment Claims
In another split decision rendered during the survey period, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of arbitration of
employment discrimination claims of union-represented employees under
collective bargaining agreements. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett," a
majority of the Court concluded that the "broad sweep" of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)89 makes arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements enforceable and held that nothing in the text of
the ADEA prohibits arbitration of age discrimination claims.'
Writing for the five-member majority,9 ' Justice Thomas stated that
the decision did not contradict the Court's decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo. 2 Justice Thomas went on to state, however, that
he believed the decision in Gardner-Denverto be "a strong candidate for
overruling."93
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the majority's decision
disregarded several long-standing Supreme Court precedents, including
94
Justice Souter issued a separate dissent, which was
Gardner-Denver.
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.95 In his dissent,
Justice Souter also argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent
with Gardner-Denver,but he further stated that the departure may have
little practical effect because of remaining questions about the enforceability of the waiver that was negotiated by the union."
The collective bargaining agreement at issue in the appeal prohibited
discrimination against employees and cited a number of federal and

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
in the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
S. 1756; § 3; H.R. 3721, § 3.
129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464-65.
Id. at 1460. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito joined
opinion. Id.
Id. at 1461; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469 n.8.
Id. at 1475-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1476 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1481.
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state discrimination laws, including the ADEA.97 The agreement went
on to provide that "'[aill such claims'" were subject to arbitration under
the bargaining agreement "'as the sole and exclusive remedy for
violations.'"98 Disputes arose under the agreement, and several
bargaining unit members filed grievances with the union. The union
proceeded to arbitration concerning those grievances but declined to
pursue grievances alleging that the company had discriminated against
the employees because of their ages. The workers then filed age
discrimination charges with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC dismissed the charges,
and the employees thereafter filed suit alleging ADEA violations. The
employer filed a motion to compel arbitration on the age-bias claims
under the collective bargaining agreement.9 9 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
holding that "a union-negotiated mandatory arbitration agreement
purporting to waive a covered worker's right to a federal forum with
respect to statutory rights is unenforceable.""' The Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that the ADEA allows for arbitration of such
claims.1 ' A majority of the Court reasoned that because the employees had designated a union to be their exclusive bargaining representative as provided for under the NLRA, and the union had entered a
collective bargaining agreement that provided for arbitration
of specific
10 2
disputes, those statutory rights had been properly waived.
C. Waivers and Releases
Two unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinions rendered during the
survey period dealt with the subject of waivers and releases under the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act.0 3 Each will be discussed
briefly.
In Wells v. Xpedx, °4 the plaintiff appealed a summary judgment in
favor of his former employer. The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for Xpedx after

97. Id. at 1461 (majority opinion).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1462.
100. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub noma. 14 Penn
Plaza LLC, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
101. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.

102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630 (2006).
104. 319 F. App'x 798 (11th Cir. 2009).
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finding that Wells had executed a valid agreement to release all claims
he had against his former employer (including any possible ADEA
claims) in exchange for his acceptance of what the court deemed a
generous severance package.' °5 The judgment of the district court was
affirmed.' 6
The court of appeals concluded that the evidence presented sufficiently
indicated that Wells indeed had knowingly and voluntarily waived his
ADEA claims. 7 The court concluded that the employer had shown
that the termination agreement had been written in a manner calculated
to be understood by Wells, who was an educated business professional
experienced in negotiating multimillion dollar contracts with large
retailers.'
In Lerman v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.,l19 the court of appeals
had occasion to consider application of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009110 to the ADEA."' The court concluded that the Ledbetter
Act was inapplicable and affirmed the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida's entry of summary judgment in favor
of Fort Lauderdale concerning an early retirement incentive
of the City
112
program.
D.

Retaliation

One unpublished retaliation decision rendered during the survey
period is worthy of brief note. In Watson v. Alabama FarmersCooperative, Inc., 3 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama on the plaintiff's retaliatory transfer claim.1 4 While accepting part of the plaintiff's argument that the district court had failed to
consider certain facts, the panel nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude that his reassignment constituted a materially adverse
employment action." 5 The court determined that the undisputed
evidence indicated the employer had created the transferred position for

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 800-01.
Id.
346 F. App'x 500 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1543 (2010) (mem.).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (West Supp. 2009).
Lerman, 346 F. App'x at 502.
Id.
323 F. App'x 726 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
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the sole purpose of providing the plaintiff with a job."16 The court
reasoned that "[wie do not believe that this is the type of action that
would dissuade 'a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.'""'

III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Despite the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008118 and
the issuance of very permissive regulations by the EEOC in the wake of
its enactment," 9 the anticipated flood of new litigation has not yet
reached the appellate court level. Cases heard by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period all
concerned claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA) 120 prior to the effective date of the Amendments Act.
A.

Prima Facie Case

The appeal in Calvo v. Walgreens Corp. 2' dealt in part with the
question of whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of
disability discrimination. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida had granted summary judgment to the
employer on the plaintiff's discrimination claim.1 22 Completely reexamining each element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had indeed established
each element on her claim.' 23 The court also concluded that the
plaintiff had sufficiently established a genuine issue of material fact
concerning her claim that Walgreens had failed to accommodate her
disability. 24
This portion
of the plaintiff's appeal was therefore
125
reversed and remanded.
The plaintiff did not fair as well in Keeler v. FloridaDepartment of
Health.1 26 The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie

116.
117.
118.
126).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 730.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (2008)).
110 Pub. L. No. 325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch.
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1600 (2009).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
340 F. App'x 618 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id.
324 F. App'x 850 (11th Cir. 2009).
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case of disability discrimination under the ADA on her failure to transfer
claim.' 27 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had
failed to show that the defendant even knew of her alleged impairments.'2 8 The plaintiff testified in her deposition that "nobody knew"
of her claimed disability when she asked to be transferred, and she
admitted that she did not disclose her disability until after the position
at issue had already been filled.'2 9 On appeal, the plaintiff asserted
that the employer should have known of her limitations "because she
took lots of notes, cried while speaking to [her supervisor] about the
transfer, and advised [her supervisor] that her position as a records
technician was stressful and overwhelming."'3 ° This behavior did not
put the department on notice that Keeler was disabled because it "in no
way suggested that Keeler was substantially limited in any major life
activity."' 3 '
B.

Business Necessity Defense

In the only published ADA decision rendered during the survey period,
a security officer who failed a mandatory hearing test challenged the
policy requiring applicants for security positions to pass the test without
the use of a hearing aid.' 32 The security officer claimed that the
33
The court of appeals
testing requirements violated the ADA.'
134
determined that there was no violation.
The court concluded that the United States Marshals Service's
prohibition against the use of hearing aides by federal court security
officers during mandatory hearing tests did not violate the ADA because
the Marshals Service had established that the ban was both job-related
'
The decision provides a good and current
and a business necessity. 35
analysis of the business necessity defense. The court concluded that
because the Marshals Service met its burden of proof, the burden shifted
to the plaintiff to offer a reasonable job accommodation that would have
allowed him to comply with the ban.' 36 It concluded that his proposal,
the complete elimination of the ban, "destroys the very standard we have

127. Id. at 851.
128. Id. at 856-57.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 856.
131. Id.
132. Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1139 (2010) (mem.).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1318.
135. Id. at 1317-18.
136. Id. at 1318.

1088

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

just upheld as a legitimate business necessity" and, thus, was unreasonable.'37
C.

Cat's Paw

In an unpublished decision, a one-handed sales employee of a
furniture company failed to show under the cat's paw theory of liability
that her firing violated the ADA. In Dwyer v.Ethan Allen Retail,
Inc., 3 ' the plaintiff claimed on appeal that her immediate supervisor
tried to have her fired because of her disability. She claimed that he
then used his superior as a "cat's paw" through which he carried out his
discriminatory intent.139
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
found that Dwyer had made a prima facie case under a cat's paw theory
but that Ethan Allen had offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for terminating her employment: her violation of company policy.14 °
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed on appeal, holding that under the cat's
paw theory, a lack of independent investigation by the decisionmaker is
a necessary element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.'
"Even
assuming that [the immediate supervisor] harbored a discriminatory
animus towards Dwyer, record evidence showed that [the ultimate
decisionmaker] independently investigated Dwyer's conduct and that
[the ultimate decisionmakeri came to her own conclusion that a Policy
violation had occurred."142
IV.
A.

SECTION 1981

Protected Activity and Retaliation

The facts in Jackson v. The GEO Group, Inc.14 are somewhat
interesting and worthy of discussion. A corrections officer sued his
private employer claiming he had been transferred, then suspended, and
ultimately fired from employment in retaliation for giving a newspaper
interview alleging racial bias at the correctional facility at which he had
been employed.'
The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida found that Jackson had not established a prima facie

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
325 F. App'x 755 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 757.

Id.
Id.
Id.
312 F. App'x 229 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 230-32.
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retaliation case with respect to his transfer, suspension, or discharge;
and even if he had, he failed to show that his former employer's
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing him was a pretext for
retaliation.145
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was only one issue in
dispute on appeal, and that was "whether Jackson showed that he was
engaging in statutorily protected activity when he decided to speak with
the newspaper reporter." 4 '
The court established the applicable
standard:
For this to have been the case, at the time he spoke with the reporter,
he must have held an objectively and subjectively reasonable belief that
he had been subjected to an adverse employment action and, as part
of the same action, had been treated differently because of his race,
thereby violating § 1981.141
The court of appeals held that the record lacked evidence that Jackson
"was engaging in statutorily protected expression." 14' Further, "[r]egardless of whether Jackson subjectively believed that he had been the
victim of racial discrimination, no objectively reasonable person would
deem this to have been the case."'49 Concluding that Jackson was not
opposing a job action "of the type necessary to establish discrimination," 5 ° the court concluded that when he had been reassigned,
Jackson had not been disciplined and did not experience a cut in pay,
benefits, rank, hours, or any other substantial loss of seniority. 1 ' The
court noted that "[a] reasonable person would not deem these changes
to constitute 'a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment,' as would be necessary for the reassignment
to be an adverse employment action and for Jackson's opposition to be
statutorily protected expression."'52 The court held that "no objective
observer would have viewed the reassignment as racially discriminato53
ry."1

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
2001)).
153.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.
Id.
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A.

FirstAmendment
In Lyon v. Ashurst,'5 4 the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her
employment complaint against the director and other employees of the
Alabama Department of Transportation. After the plaintiff resigned her
employment with the Alabama Department of Transportation, the
department director instructed that a "Do Not Re-hire" notation be
placed in her personnel file because of her "disruptive, argumentative,
and confrontational behavior" during her employment.15 5 Unaware of
this notation, the plaintiff sought but was denied several other jobs
within the Alabama Department of Transportation, the State of
Alabama, and other state agencies. When the plaintiff eventually
learned of the "Do Not Re-hire" notation, litigation ensued. The plaintiff
asserted in part that she had been retaliated against for filing a
grievance and due to her participation in a hearing concerning another
grievant during her employment. 56 The plaintiff claimed that the
retaliatory actions violated her First Amendment 57 speech rights.'5
The court concluded that because her speech was asserted in the context
of an administrative proceeding, it was personal to her and the other
employee and did not involve a public forum.'59 Consequently, her
speech did not involve a matter of public concern. 6 ' Her First Amendment claim was therefore dismissed.' 6'
ProceduralDue Process
The case of Rademakers v. Scott 62 presented the Eleventh Circuit
with a procedural due process question. The Sheriff's Office of Lee
County, Florida, had employed Rademakers, first as a patrol officer and
then later as a detective. In 2006 she attended a retirement party for
a high-ranking sheriff's department official, where it was alleged that
she engaged in inappropriate behavior.' 6 ' After the party, coworkers

B.

154. No. 08-16778, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24726 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009).
155. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at *3.
157.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Lyon, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24726, at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
350 F. App'x 408 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 409.
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complained that the plaintiff had rubbed her breasts against employees
and engaged in other "inappropriate physical contact."1" An investigation of the complaints was undertaken, and the department concluded
that Rademakers had indeed committed conduct unbecoming an officer
and also had been insubordinate by lying during the investigation. After
Rademakers received notice of the investigation and of the likelihood
that she would be terminated from employment because of its findings,
she chose instead to resign her position of employment. Thereafter, she
brought suit contending that she had been constructively discharged
when forced to choose between resignation or termination without a pretermination hearing. She also complained that she had been deprived
of her liberty and property interest in her reputation and of continued
employment in law enforcement without due process of law.1" Rademakers testified at deposition that she learned that her termination
"was a done deal" and that she either could resign or be fired if she did
'
not do so. 66
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a resignation from employment in
response to "imminent termination may be considered voluntary if the
totality of the circumstances suggest the decision to resign was a
deliberate one."'67 "Because Rademakers resigned of [her] own free
will even though prompted to do so by events set in motion by [her]
employer, [she] relinquished [her] [liberty] interest voluntarily and thus
cannot establish that [Scott] 'deprived' [her] of it within the meaning of
the due process clause."" 6
C.

Qualified Immunity

'
In Bryant v. Jones,69
the Eleventh Circuit held that Dekalb County,
Georgia public officials were not entitled to qualified immunity against
claims that they "embarked on a wholesale plan to replace its white
county managers with African Americans." ' ° Former white county
managers sued the DeKalb County chief executive officer, who was
black, and others claiming that they were driven from their jobs as a
part of the executive's call to establish a "darker administration" for the

164. Id.
165. Id. at 409-10.
166. Id. at 410.
167. Id. at 412.
168. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1993)).
169. 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1536 (2010) (mem.).
170. Id. at 1288.
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county.'7 ' In December 2006 the district court rejected efforts to
dismiss the case on qualified immunity grounds.1 72 A unanimous
Eleventh Circuit affirmed: "Because a reasonable official would have
known that discriminating against county managers on account of their
race was unlawful, the district court ruled correctly in denying the
"Although we are careful not to
defendants qualified immunity."17
gild the lily, [one of the white managers] has introduced shocking
7
evidence of an overt and unabashed pattern of discrimination.""
VI.

A.

SECTION 1985

A Heightened PleadingStandard?

In Lyon v. Ashurst,'76 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit applied the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' 76 pleading
standard to a § 1985 action.'77 The plaintiff's amended complaint had
been dismissed by the district court because it failed to allege or support
an inference that the claimed conspiracy as a whole was motivated by
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed and
class-based animus.17
said that the "[plaintiff's grounds for her entitlement to relief were no
more than 'labels and conclusions, and a formalistic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action."" 79 "Even accepting all the allegations
in [the] [plaintiff's amended180 complaint as true, only speculation can fill
the gaps in the complaint."
It is reasonable to anticipate increased reliance on Twombly by the
employment defense bar to require the plaintiffs to more clearly plead
their attempted claims and a corresponding increase in motions to
dismiss practice in the district courts. Appeals practice in this area may
see an increase as well.

171. Id. at 1289.
172. Id. at 1294.
173. Id. at 1300.
174. Id. at 1299.
175. No. 08-16778, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24726 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009). For
additional discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
176. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In Twombly the United States Supreme Court raised the
pleading bar in securities law class actions. See id. Since the decision was rendered,
litigants and jurists have struggled with the questions of the proper scope and breadth of
the new heightened pleading standard to other causes of action, including employment
cases.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2006); see Lyon, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24726.
178. Lyon, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24726, at *3.
179. Id. at *7 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555).
180. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Unpublished employment decisions continue to be the hallmark of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during the
survey period. United States Supreme Court decisions rendered during
the survey period provided the most interesting fodder and continue to
reflect the conservative evolution of the Roberts Court.

